Introduction
Computer platforms are becoming widely available and are fundamental to the successful spreading of electronic business and commerce. This makes the need to protect information even more compelling, particularly on the type of platforms we use directly (e.g., PCs, laptops, PDAs, cellphones). The need for stronger trust and confidence in computer platforms increases with connectivity and physical mobility. In addition to threats associated with connecting to the Internet, such as the downloading of malicious programs, physical mobility increases the risk of unauthorized access to the platforms including actual theft. Trusted platform technology provides mechanisms that are useful in both circumstances, by allowing systems to extend trust to clients running on these platforms.
Trusted platforms are computer platforms characterized by specialized hardware designed for security operations. This dedicated hardware is often called trusted platform module. Various initiatives in trusted computing [7] aim at designing software building blocks and interfaces that exploit the functionalities of the trusted platform technology. Among the several security-related functionalities that these platforms offer, remote attestation allows a local platform to authenticate a combination of hardware and software stack running in a remote platform. A local platform, by determining the environment of a remote platform, is in the position to better evaluate the amount of trust it is willing to extend on the remote one.
In this paper we focus on the process of remote attestation which is done by means of digital signatures, as in [4] and [3] , and that relies on the existence of a hierarchical public key infrastructure for identity, certificates and key management. In this context, we analyze the credentials and beliefs that are necessary to a local platform in order for the remote attestation process to be both successful and meaningful. We say that a remote attestation process is successful if, by combining the trust that a local platform has in different certification authorities, and the content of all the certificates making up the various chains, the local platform is able to identify the composition of the remote platform. The remote attestation process is said to be meaningful if the local platform is able to consider the remote environment as safe, by using the information obtained during the remote platform authentication together with the beliefs of the local platform.
For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we will assume that the remote platform is made up of three layers, that is, starting from the upper level, the application A, which runs on top of the operating system OS, which runs on top of the dedicated security hardware, that we call trusted platform module (TPM).
The paper is structured as follows: we start by recalling the main constructs used by the theory employed in our analysis (Section 2). Then, we analyze the credentials and beliefs that are needed when authenticating a single remote layer (Section 3), and we generalize the discussion to a set of layers making up the remote platform hardware and software stack (Section 4). We then analyze the credentials and beliefs needed to make the attestation process meaningful (Section 5). Finally, we make some observations on the complexity of the process of remote attestation which is based on PKIs (Section 6), and we make our final remarks.
Notation
In order to understand the remote attestation process we need to be able to reason about the content of certificates, to see how they combine together into chains, and how different chains combine together with the local platform's beliefs. We, therefore, need a vocabulary for describing the content of certificates and beliefs, and rules in order to understand what can be inferred by their combination. To this end, we have chosen to model the certificates and the beliefs in this paper with a logic for authentication. This logic is introduced in [5] , and has already been used for describing the concepts and primary APIs employed in Microsoft's Next Generation Security Computing Base (NGSCB) [3] . In what follows we will give a brief overview of the notation and theorems used by this logic. The description tries to catch the main aspects intuitively, and is not to be considered either rigorous or complete. The interested reader may refer to [5] for a complete description of the theory.
The theory described in [5] is centered around the concepts of statements, principals, and channels. A statement is defined as a request, an assertion; a principal is whoever is able to produce an assertion, such as people, machines, or groups of people. Channels are defined as principals that are able to say things directly, as wires, I/O ports, encrypted channels, or network addresses.
Different types of channels produce statements in different ways. In this paper we are interested in channels made up of an asymmetric key pair. Using K and K −1 for identifying the public and private key respectively, a statement s signed by the private key corresponding to K is expressed by the theory with K says s
In other words, when we write K says s we mean that a certificate has been issued which contains the statement s and the signature which is performed on it by the key K −1 . A certificate signed by a certification authority CA with its private key K −1 CA asserting that the principal A owns the key pair (K A , K −1 A ), is expressed with
and it is read as "K CA says that K A speaks for A". In the previous expression, K A ⇒ A is an example of a statement. Intuitively, it means that everything that is said (signed) by K A is considered as said by A. Or, in other words, that K A has the authority to make statements on behalf of A. A statement may be whatever it is necessary to state (i.e. to sign) in a certain framework. A further example of statement is about group membership. A CA may state the principal A's membership to the group G by issuing the certificate
where the group name G is defined in the CA's namespace.
The theory assumes that the hand-off axiom holds (Section 3.3 in [5] ). It states that a principal has the right to specify who can speak for it. In other words, if A says K A ⇒ A, then anyone can safely assume that K A ⇒ A. How A materially utters the statement depends on what kind of principal it is. If A is a human, he could produce the statement by using a handwritten signature on a paper containing a fingerprint of his public key. Although this is a valid way to produce such a statement, it is not recognized by a computer and, as such, it is not practical in cases where the authentication is performed by machines. In this case, if we know that some principal CA, whose key is K CA , has the authority to speak on behalf of A (i.e. K CA ⇒ A), then a statement like K CA says K A ⇒ A, could be considered valid to believe that K A ⇒ A. The theory models this concept by introducing the extended handoff axiom (equation (P11) in [5] ), which we can rephrase in the context of certification authorities as follows: anybody believing that K CA ⇒ A, and receiving the statement
The theory also employs the concept of roles (defined in Section 6 of [5] ) which we can informally define as a way to limit a principal's authority according to a given sets of rules. The theory considers the principal A acting in the role R to be a compound principal derived from A, and writes it as A|R. The following axiom (which we will call role axiom) is presented in [5] (Section 6, expressions (R1) and (R2)): for every principal A and every role R, A ⇒ A|R.
Let us explain this axiom with reference to the TPM key K TPM and the operating system OS running on top of the TPM. When the TPM executes the program OS, it is limiting its behavior according to a certain set of rules, that is the set of rules that correspond to the OS' specifications. Since behaving according to a set of rules can be seen as acting according to a given role, we can equate a program with a role (Section 6, in [5] ). Therefore, the previous axiom can be used in the case where the principal A is the key K TPM and the role R is the program OS, whose ID is ID OS :
The axiom holds because the TPM, like any other principal, has the authority to speak for itself when it is limiting its authority. The importance of this axiom will be more evident in Section 4.
Other theorems and axioms of the logic will be used in the following sections as they are needed. In this paper, for brevity, we have chosen not to detail them, in favor of giving intuitions on the line of reasoning. We refer to [2] for a more theoretical insight on the formulas used, to [5] for a rigorous description of the logic, and to [1, 8] for its application in modeling different systems.
Authenticating a remote layer
The remote attestation process allows a local platform to cryptographically authenticate the hardware and the stack of software running on a remote platform. As part of this, the local platform must firstly be able to authenticate each single layer that constitutes the remote stack, secondly to authenticate the stack in its entirety. In this section we will consider the first aspect, i.e. the authentication of a single layer in the remote platform, with reference to a framework of independent hierarchical organizations.
In what follows, we will use the term layer (L) to refer to a generic component in the remote platform stack. So doing, the discussion in this section will apply to the authentication of both a hardware component, like the trusted platform module, and of a software image which is part of the software stack running on a remote platform.
In order to uniquely authenticate a remote layer, it is necessary to authenticate its manufacturer beforehand. In fact, besides the layer's name being meaningful only in the manufacturer's namespace, the layer's key pair (or ID, if it is a software) is normally certified by the manufacturer that ships it. In the more general case, a manufacturer will be an organization with its own public key infrastructure. Often, the PKI employed will be hierarchical, and not necessarily modeled on the organizational chart.
In order to fix ideas, but without loss of generality, we will consider that a remote layer L is a product (software or hardware) made by an organization with a simple 2-layered PKI infrastructure. Within the organization, the root certification authority, which we call V L , certifies its trusted platform compliant products by means of an intermediate certification authority, called Tr L . This delegation of authority is expressed by means of the following certificate:
where the operator '/' selects the nodes in a hierarchical PKI with a file-system like notation 1 . Tr L , in turn, will generate a certificate for the product L, in order to certify its identity, as follows:
Consider the case in which a platform P L outside L's organization wants to authenticate L. If P L receives the certificates shown above, then it cannot infer anything useful, since it does not know who K V L is, and which authority it has. In order for P L to be able to authenticate a generic layer which is located in the tree of V L , P L needs to believe that K V L is the key of V L , and that V L is the certification 1 In order to keep the notation intuitive, we use the expression V L /Tr L / * in place of the compound principal V L /Tr L except '..'. The operators '/', except, and the operand '..' are defined in Section 5.2 in [5] .
authority of the tree V L / * , rooted in V L itself. To this end, the belief K V L ⇒ V L / * is necessary. In fact, by using it, together with (2) and (3), and by using the transitivity property of ⇒, and the extended hand-off axiom, P L will be able to infer
In the general case, if P L is to be able to authenticate every layer belonging to the organizations O 1 . . . O n , then it has to know (believe) that
A straightforward approach is for P L to build a repository of these root certificates. Since this repository will contain an entry for every organization, this approach in not scalable and is likely to be subject to problems of maintenance. As an example, every entry needs to be updated whenever a change or revocation of an organization root key occurs. Moreover, as new organizations need to be authenticated, their corresponding entries will have to be inserted in the repository. The usual approach to deal with it, is to use external certification authorities, that are not part of the organizations, but are nevertheless trusted to certify the organizations' roots certification authorities. If, for instance, P L trusts the certification authority CA to perform the certification of different organizations, then it can put in its repository of root certificates just the entry
This means that the certification authority whose key is K CA is trusted by P L to authenticate every root certification authority of every organization ("*" stands for anybody). In this way, when P L receives the certificates of the layer L belonging to the organization V L , which is certified by CA
then, by using (
which is what it needs. Due to its critical function in the authentication of remote entities, we call CA a root of trust for authentication for P L . The roots of trust for authentication are those initial beliefs of a local platform that, taken together with the set of certificates received, and by applying the rules of the logic, allow the local platform to infer beliefs on the identity of the remote platform. Summing up, the credentials and the beliefs that are necessary to P L in order to authenticate a remote layer L are represented by expressions (5) and (4), respectively.
Authenticating a set of remote layers
In the previous section we have analyzed the aspects related to the authentication of a layer in a remote platform. In this section we will extend the analysis to cover the whole remote platform stack, from the hardware up to the application. In order for the local platform to authenticate the remote one, the former must firstly authenticate every layer making up the latter, and secondly to assess that all the layers are actually part of the same software/hardware stack.
Let us focus on the first step, the authentication of the layers of the remote platform P R . For simplicity, we assume that the vendors of the TPM, the OS, and the application (V TPM , V OS , and V A , respectively), are all structured in a 2-layered PKI as described in the previous section. In this case, we can obtain the certificates that are necessary to authenticate the three layers by applying the same reasoning of the previous section, and considering the remote layer as TPM, OS, and A, respectively:
The second step consists in assessing that all the authenticated layers are actually part of the same software/hardware stack. This process requires building a certificate chain from the trusted hardware all the way up to the application. To this end, each software layer (OS and A in this case) that wants to be certified generates a key pair and makes an endorse API call to the lower layer, passing as parameters its public key and other data it wants to be certified [4] . The certificate that is generated through this process contains an ID which uniquely identifies the software layer making the endorse call. This ID can be the hash of the program image corresponding to the software layer, and, possibly, of its configuration parameters.
Using K TPM to refer to the key pair embedded in the TPM, K OS for the temporary key generated by the operating system, and ID OS for the code ID of the OS, the certificate generated by the endorse call of the OS is:
With this, the TPM certifies that the key K OS has the authority to speak for the trusted platform module running the operating system whose ID is ID OS . Likewise, the certificate generated by the OS upon the endorse call of the application is:
By using (1) in (7) and its homologous (
in (8), we get to:
and, by replacing K OS in the second statement with the right side of the first statement, for the monotonicity of the operator | and the transitivity of ⇒, we get to
In other words, every platform P L receiving the certificates (7) and (8) can conclude that the key K A speaks for a layer identified as ID A that runs on top of a layer ID OS , that, in turn, runs on top of a layer identified by the key
In order for P L to identify these IDs as the application A, the operating system OS, and the trusted platform module TPM, respectively, P L needs to receive all the certificates that authenticate each one of these layers, as explained at the beginning of this section. By using these certificates, together with its belief in the roots of trust for authentication, P L can infer:
Using these beliefs, together with the belief (9), the local platform is finally able to infer:
which means, in prose, that the key K A is the temporary key of an instance of the application A, certified as trusted by its vendor V A . It is running on top of the operating system OS, certified as trusted by its vendor V OS . OS is running on a trusted platform TPM certified as trusted by its manufacturer V TPM .
Summing up, what is necessary to a local platform in order to authenticate an application running on a remote platform is its belief in one ore more certification authorities that authenticate the roots of the vendors' PKI (4), the set of certificates that make up the PKI of the vendors (6) , and the set of endorse calls (7) and (8).
Assessing the safety of a remote platform
In the previous section we have found what credentials and beliefs are necessary in order for a local platform P L to authenticate the environment of a remote platform P R , where an application is running. However, being able to authenticate the stack of a remote platform, does not answer an important question: is that configuration safe for the local platform? Answering this question means evaluating the safety of the remote platform.
The attestation process is meaningful to P L if it can get to believe that:
where τ C is the set of configurations considered safe for the remote application, according to the actions that the local one wants to perform (refer to Section 2 for the notation on group membership). In fact, by using this, together with (11), by the transitivity property of ⇒, P L can infer K A ⇒ τ C . This means, in prose, that the key K A belongs to an instance of an application which is part of a platform in a known trusted state.
There are two issues related to (12). Firstly, since it is a belief, it needs to be derived from a trusted source in the form, as an example, of a certificate. Secondly, in order for a local platform to be prepared to evaluate the safety of a random remote application, the former needs to receive evidence as in (12) for every possible remote platform configuration. This second issue can be kept simpler by grouping TPMs, operating systems, and applications in trusted and untrusted, and then considering a remote platform safe if its stack is made up of trusted entities. The information related to grouping can be distributed by independent security organizations or by security companies, in the form of certificates. Alternatively, it can be entered manually into the local platform by its system administrator. As an example, the local system administrator could enter the following beliefs into the local platform:
With these, the local platform believes that TPM, certified by Tr TPM , and, in turn, certified by V TPM belongs to the group τ TPM . By using the same reasoning, it believes that OS and A belong to the group τ OS and τ A , respectively. The last belief states that if a member of the group τ A runs on top of a member of the group τ OS , which runs on top of a member of the group τ TPM , then the configuration is member of the group τ C . Therefore, if the local platform knows that τ C is a group of safe configurations for the remote application, then by using the beliefs in (13), together with (11), it can infer
which is exactly what it needs.
A more relaxed security profile could trust some authorities to certify which entities belong to which groups, as follows:
With these beliefs, the authority CA TPM , CA OS , CA A will be trusted to assess the safety of TPMs, OSs, and applications, respectively. Due to their critical role in the evaluation of the safety of a remote platform, we call the beliefs in (13) or in (14) the roots of trust for safety evaluation for P L . The certificates that P L needs in order to evaluate the safety of P R are dependent on its roots of trust for safety evaluation. As an example, by using the roots of trust in (14), the certificates that P L needs to receive to evaluate P R (to understand that K A ⇒ τ C ) are:
Notice that every combination of roots of trust for safety evaluation and certificates can be used, as long as they allow to determine K A ⇒ τ C .
Summing up, what is necessary to a local platform in order to evaluate the safety of a remote platform, is its roots of trust for safety evaluation, i.e. trusted statements that provide information either on which platforms to consider safe (13), or on authorities to trust for the safety evaluation (14). In the latter case, the local platform needs also a set of certificates (15) produced by these authorities that complement the beliefs allowing to evaluate the safety of the platform.
Discussion
In the previous sections we have described the credentials and beliefs that are necessary in order to perform a successful and meaningful remote attestation. At this end, we have considered a simplified scenario where the remote platform is made up of three layers, the vendor's PKIs are made up of two levels of CAs, and they are all certified by the same certification authority CA.
Even in this simplified scenario, we have found that, for a successful remote attestation, we need eleven certificates (shown in (6), (7) and (8)) and one belief in the root of trust for authentication (4) . Then, analyzing the meaningful remote attestation, and assuming a simplified trust model, we have shown that four beliefs in the roots of trust for safety evaluation are needed (14), together with four certificates (15) produced by these authorities. In total, in this simple example, a local platform has to verify fifteen certificates and has to rely on five authorities, in order to evaluate the safety of a remote platform. If we consider that the process of verifying a certificate involves querying an online certificate revocation service, we can see how remote attestation based on certificates can be prone to blocking. If, in fact, one of the revocation services is not reachable, the whole attestation process cannot be completed [6] .
It is also important to notice how the roots of trust for safety evaluation represent a key authority for assessing the safety of a remote platform. An important issue is therefore how to choose them. It is unlikely that vendors of software or hardware products can be chosen as roots of trust for safety evaluation. With the spreading of trusted computing technology, in fact, remote attestation will become the prerequisite for carrying on transactions, and vendors will have very little incentive in certifying that their products, when combined with others, make the remote platform untrusted. Therefore, a more reliable approach is likely to be based on independent security certification authorities or security communities, that may be able to estimate more accurately the safety of the combination of different software and hardware layers.
Conclusions
Remote attestation is a new functionality offered by trusted platform computing, which may be useful to a local platform in order to extend trust to a remote one. In this paper we have analyzed which credentials and beliefs are necessary in order for this process to be successful and meaningful.
The paper has the following merits. First, it decouples the concept of remote attestation in successful and meaningful, and describes how to separate trust between authorities (roots of trust) for authentication and authorities for safety evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this aspect has not been considered in previous works.
Second, it explains the content of every certificate and belief involved. In particular, by using a logic for authentication, we have discussed why every certificate and every belief is needed and how it relates to the others. Understanding these relationships is useful for choosing the certificates and the assumptions on which systems that use remote attestation rely. Works like [4] present the attestation model based on authentication and endorse calls, but do not describe in detail what is the content of every certificate and why it has to be so. The same semantic approach based on [5] is taken by [1] , but it is limited to the NGSCB architecture and does not investigate what is necessary for achieving a meaningful remote attestation.
Third, and last, we have made some observations on the complexity of the process of remote attestation which is based on public key infrastructures. The number of certificates and beliefs that we have found to be necessary to support the process of remote attestation, gives an indication of the degree of the difficulty of such a process.
